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HELLER’S SCAPEGOATS* 
KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL** 
In the United States, a psychiatric diagnosis, or involuntary civil 
commitment to a psychiatric ward—which is considered 
treatment in the medical context—almost always leads to quasi-
criminalization in the legal context. After such diagnosis or 
treatment, you are rendered, automatically and permanently, a 
member of one of our nation’s most vulnerable populations and 
stripped of rights based on your status. In no area is the U.S. 
populace in greater agreement over this stripping of rights than in 
the areas of gun control and civil commitment, especially in our 
apparently new “era of spree-killings.” When it comes to 
stripping gun rights and involuntarily treating people with 
psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”), politicians and pundits on the 
left and the right are eerily aligned. This Article provides an 
answer as to why: PPDs are our society’s scapegoats, the tool we 
use to externalize our fear of the unpredictable violence of what 
appears to be the rise of spree-killings. Involuntary civil 
commitment and gun control work together to scapegoat PPDs: 
often the response to an act of otherwise unexplainable violence 
is for pundits and politicians on the left and the right to discuss 
ways to involuntarily commit PPDs and ways to prevent PPDs 
from getting their hands on guns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the final legal writing exam during a recent semester, all the 
first-year students were given the same closed-universe assignment. In 
the fact pattern, a husband brings his wife to the Emergency 
Department (“E.D.”) of a local hospital because she is behaving 
erratically. The E.D. psychiatrist evaluates the wife. Because the wife 
had been taking prednisone, a steroid, for a severe case of poison ivy, 
the doctor diagnoses her with steroid-induced psychosis. After 
treating her with a benzodiazepine to calm her, and seeing that she 
has regained lucidity, the doctor asks if the wife would like to stay the 
night in the psychiatric unit. She says she does not want to. Rather 
than force her to stay, the doctor releases the wife into her husband’s 
care with orders not to let her drive. Unfortunately, the next day, she 
takes the car keys without her husband’s knowledge and drives 
erratically, paralyzing herself from the waist down in a single-car 
accident. The husband and wife sue the hospital for patient-dumping.1 
Their expert witness asserts in an affidavit that the psychiatrist in the 
E.D. should have involuntarily committed the wife until her psychosis 
passed. 
 
 1. Patient-dumping occurs when a hospital does not take appropriate steps to 
stabilize a patient’s condition before discharge. See Emergency Medical Treatment & 
Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2012) (requiring stabilization of 
patients before they can be discharged from the hospital). 
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Soon after they received the problem, my students—nearly all of 
them—came into my office troubled that the psychiatrist had not 
involuntarily committed the wife the night she presented at the E.D. 
with erratic behavior. They demanded to know why the doctor did 
not lose his medical license for such a major oversight. They could not 
believe that the doctor would risk the plaintiff’s life and, in this 
particular case, legs, over such a small thing as an involuntary stay in a 
psych ward. 
Of course, the students’ conclusions about the doctor’s oversight 
were wrong legally because the cause of action was for patient-
dumping. By offering a bed, the doctor had likely done his duty under 
the relevant statute and could not be held liable.2 More importantly, 
the students’ conclusions—indeed, their anger toward the doctor—
revealed that they were operating with a wildly incomplete picture of 
what it means to be designated mentally ill in America, a place where 
there is no such thing as a small stay in a psych ward. 
What my students failed to understand—and how could they?—
is how a psychiatric diagnosis, or involuntary civil commitment to a 
psychiatric ward, which is treatment in the medical context, leads 
almost always to quasi-criminalization3 in the legal context. A 
diagnosis or commitment renders a person, automatically and 
permanently, a member of one of the most vulnerable populations in 
the United States. 
There are many unexpected ways that U.S. citizens are stripped 
of privacy and rights based on status (of being psychiatrically 
disabled) or history of treatment (of being involuntarily committed).4 
 
 2. EMTALA only requires that an emergency patient receive appropriate screening, 
stabilization, and, if appropriate, transfer to another location for continued treatment. Id. 
§ 1395dd. Because the doctor in this case not only screened and stabilized the patient, but 
also offered her a bed in the ward for the night, he met his duties under EMTALA. See id. 
Whether the doctor committed malpractice under the relevant state law was a separate 
legal issue. 
 3. I borrow the term “quasi-criminal” in the context of psychiatry from Christopher 
Slobogin. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 19 (2006). Despite the quasi-criminal 
nature of the mental health system in the United States, Slobogin points out that “mental 
health law is a legal backwater.” Id. Furthermore, “[d]espite the fact that they can lead to 
significant losses of liberty, commitment and competency cases continue to be handled by 
‘special,’ lower-level courts that are often not even courts ‘of record’ because their 
proceedings are not transcribed.” Id. at 20. Basically, Slobogin asserts, “this area of the 
law occupies a very low status.” Id. The cause? “The primary reason for this state of affairs 
is society’s general disregard for and ignorance about people with mental disability.” Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Leslie Doty Hollingsworth, Child Custody Loss Among Women with 
Persistent Severe Mental Illness, 28 SOC. WORK RES. 199, 199 (2004) (observing an 
“increased likelihood of child custody loss for most women with persistent mental 
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What is perhaps most remarkable about this rights-stripping is how 
many nondisabled Americans actually have no problem with this 
rights-stripping, as I will demonstrate in this Article,5 despite their 
differences in political opinions on other issues.6 
In no area is this radical agreement more stark than in the 
debates over gun control, civil commitment, and mental illness, 
especially in our new, apparent “era of spree-killings.”7 When it 
comes to stripping gun rights and involuntarily treating people with 
psychiatric disabilities8 (“PPDs”), politicians and pundits on the left 
and the right are eerily aligned.9 This Article provides an answer as to 
why: people with psychiatric disabilities are our society’s scapegoats, 
the tool we use to externalize our fear of the unpredictable violence 
 
illness”); David Sherfinski, Mental Illness in Youth Could Prevent Gun Purchases in 
Adulthood, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/ 
jan/7/mental-illness-in-youth-could-prevent-gun-purchase/ (pointing out the Department 
of Justice’s weighing of whether to include someone who was treated for a mental illness 
while a minor on the national background check system for gun purchases, thereby 
preventing the person from being able to purchase a gun as an adult); Lisa T. McElroy & 
Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Worst Part of the Bar Exam, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2014, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2014/08/bar_examiner
s_ask_lawyer_applicants_about_mental_health_the_question_policy.html (“[M]ost state 
bar examiners—agencies that serve under each state’s highest court—still ask bar 
applicants about their mental health histories.”). 
 5. And even some people with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”) themselves—they 
distance themselves from those other PPDs whom they perceive as worse. See infra notes 
124–36 and accompanying text (discussing Andrew Solomon). 
 6. See infra Part III.D for further discussion of how politicians and pundits across the 
political spectrum agree on civil commitment and gun control vis-à-vis PPDs. 
 7. The “era of spree-killings” is my term. According to research, the number of mass 
killings per capita does indeed seem to be rising. But, as I discuss infra, our news media 
also now cover spree-killings in a unique fashion. These two factors work together to 
create an “era,” or moment in time, in which the shootings capture the public imagination. 
For more on the recent rise of spree-killings, see Editorial, The Quickening Pace of Gun 
Sprees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/opinion/the-
quickening-pace-of-gun-sprees.html (“The average annual number of shooting sprees with 
multiple casualties was 6.4 from 2000 to 2006. That jumped to 16.4 a year from 2007 to 
2013, according to the study of 160 incidents of gun mayhem since 2000.”); Mark Follman, 
More Guns, More Mass Shootings—Coincidence?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/mass-shootings-investigation (“[T]he rate of 
mass shootings has increased in recent years—at a time when America has been flooded 
with millions of additional firearms and a barrage of new laws has made it easier than ever 
to carry them in public places.”). 
 8. The use of the language of “disability” to describe what many refer to as “mental 
illnesses” is a sign of progress in our society. For example, mental “disorders” are now 
recognized as disabling conditions by the Social Security Administration. 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1520a (2014). The SSA provides an appendix in which it lists the psychiatric 
disabilities that it considers disabling for the purposes of its administration. 20 C.F.R. pt. 
404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 (listing mental disorders for adults). 
 9. See infra Part III.D (discussing this alignment of opinion). 
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of what appears to be the rise of spree-killings. This scapegoating 
makes PPDs some of the most vulnerable quasi- and actual 
participants in our criminal justice system. 
Involuntary civil commitment and gun control work together to 
scapegoat PPDs: often the response to an act of otherwise 
unexplainable violence is for pundits and politicians on the left and 
the right to discuss ways to round up PPDs (using various degrees of 
sympathetic language)10 and ways to prevent PPDs from getting their 
hands on guns.11 
Because, in the context of the scapegoat, the topic of involuntary 
commitment is inextricable from the context of gun rights, I discuss 
them together in this Article. In Part I, I outline the theory of the 
scapegoat and show how scapegoating functions to isolate PPDs in 
U.S. society and render them vulnerable. In Part II, I examine the gun 
control debate, in particular the District of Columbia v. Heller12 
opinion of 2008, to illustrate how PPDs (along with other outsider 
populations) are scapegoated in arguments over gun control, in order 
to create fear of dangerous people and thereby justify the ownership 
of guns. After all, if there were no scary people that one needed to 
protect oneself against, one would not need a gun for self-protection. 
In Part III, I turn to the emergency involuntary commitment debate 
through the lens of the Washington Navy Yard shooting of 
September 16, 2013, to illustrate how scapegoating PPDs functioned 
to reassure the American populace in the wake of violence. 
In both sections, I show how PPDs are scapegoated by 
politicians, pundits, and judges on both the left and the right. As I 
demonstrate infra, there can no longer be a spree-killing without a 
newscaster or politician asking, “Was the killer crazy”? Mental illness 
has become our society’s go-to means to explain away gun violence 
and thereby protect the individual right to bear arms. But when 
reading Heller, and the debates surrounding involuntary emergency 
civil commitment, it is difficult to see how PPDs also possess the 
individual right to own a gun and protect their homes; it is as though 
PPDs are, in Second Amendment terms, not people at all. 
 
 10. See infra Part III for near-unanimous arguments in favor of easing the standards 
for involuntary emergency civil commitment. 
 11. See infra Part II for near-unanimous arguments in favor of preventing PPDs from 
purchasing firearms. 
 12. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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II.  PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES: OUR MODERN-DAY 
SCAPEGOATS 
People with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”) in U.S. society are 
scapegoats for a variety of social ills, most notably and recently, gun 
violence.13 For example, the political left and right have united in 
disturbing ways on both the political and punditry fronts in their 
scapegoating of PPDs after violent “spree-killing” events, despite 
well-respected research that shows that PPDs are not more likely 
than people in the regular population to commit violent crimes,14 and 
indeed, they are far more likely to be the victims of such crimes.15 The 
overrepresentation of PPDs in the criminal justice system, in our post-
deinstitutionalization era, most often stems from minor infractions 
such as overuse of alcohol or “self-medicat[ion] with . . . street 
drugs”16 rather than violent crime.17 Despite the data showing the lack 
 
 13. See infra Part III for specific examples of scapegoating of the mentally ill in the 
context of particular gun violence tragedies. 
 14. See, e.g., Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence 
and Mental Disorder, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152, 152 (2009) (studying a U.S. 
sample of more than 34,000 PPDs over a four-year period to see which factors predict 
violent behavior); Jillian K. Peterson et al., How Often and How Consistently Do 
Symptoms Directly Precede Criminal Behavior Among Offenders with Mental Illness?, 38 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 439 (2014) (“Although offenders with mental illness are 
overrepresented in the criminal justice system, psychiatric symptoms relate weakly to 
criminal behavior at the group level.”). Elbogen and Johnson’s results showed that “severe 
mental illness alone did not significantly predict committing violent acts; rather, historical, 
dispositional, and contextual factors were associated with future violence.” Elbogen & 
Johnson, supra, at 155. Indeed, “severe mental illness did not rank among the strongest 
predictors of violent behavior in this sample.” Id. at 157. Furthermore, the study “revealed 
that people with any type of severe mental illness were not at increased risk of committing 
serious/severe violent acts such as use of deadly weapons, inflicting extreme physical harm, 
or forcing sexual acts.” Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass 
Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 242 (2015) 
(“Extensive surveys of police incident reports demonstrate that, far from posing threats to 
others, people diagnosed with schizophrenia have victimization rates 65% to 130% higher 
than those of the general public.”); Linda A. Teplin et al., Crime Victimization in Adults 
with Severe Mental Illness: Comparison with the National Crime Victimization Survey, 62 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 911, 911 (2005) (“More than one quarter of persons with 
SMI [severe mental illness] had been victims of a violent crime in the past year, a rate 
more than 11 times higher than the general population rates even after controlling for 
demographic differences between the 2 samples.”). 
 16. E. Fuller Torrey et al., More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons than 
Hospitals: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT ADVOC. CENTER 3 (May 2010), 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.
pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 14, at 157; Megan Cassidy, The 
Revolving Door: Wyoming Reliance on Jails for Mental Health Services Comes with 
Consequences, STAR-TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2014), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/the-
revolving-door-wyoming-reliance-on-jails-for-mental-health/article_b5792c78-2613-5417-
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of violent tendencies on the part of PPDs, public perceptions of the 
dangerousness of PPDs is dramatically high.18 In one study, “75% of 
the sample viewed people with mental illness as dangerous.”19 This 
misconception stands in stark contrast with a recent multivariate 
study that pulled out multiple risk factors, showing that “if a person 
has severe mental illness without substance abuse and history of 
violence, he or she has the same chances of being violent during the 
next 3 years as any other person in the general population.”20 
With such considerable agreement on the supposed 
dangerousness of PPDs, it is not surprising that PPDs serve as a social 
scapegoat.21 
 
a77d-b3ae8ee10c97.html. Cassidy discusses how Wyoming’s jails and prisons have become 
de facto mental health facilities for PPDs who commit minor infractions or who are 
addicts:  
Wyoming advocates say many of these inmates are not hardened criminals. Like 
Overfield, many people with mental illnesses will repeatedly commit minor 
offenses that are triggered by their afflictions. A drug addiction, some say, is 
preferable to acknowledging their own mental illness. For others, advocates say, 
treatment is simply not accessible. 
Cassidy, supra. 
 
 18. Elbogen and Johnson note that their research on the lack of dangerousness of 
PPDs contradicts the public’s perception of PPDs: “Such data are at odds with public fears 
such as those reported in a national survey in which 75% of the sample viewed people with 
mental illness as dangerous.” Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 14, at 157 (citing Bruce G. 
Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and 
Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1330–33 (1999)). Furthermore, they note 
“60% believed people with schizophrenia were likely to commit violent acts.” Id. (citing 
Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, and 
Need for Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 AM. J. PUBLIC 
HEALTH 1339, 1341 (1999)). 
 19. Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 14, at 157. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Feeding into this scapegoat mentality is the fact that many of the perpetrators of 
the high-profile spree-killings do indeed have psychiatric disabilities. But this fact clouds 
the issues at hand. Proponents of individual gun rights, such as the National Rifle 
Association (“NRA”), argue that all PPDs should lose their gun rights because of the acts 
of a very small violent few, hiding that the vast majority of gun violence and gun deaths 
are not caused by PPDs and that most gun violence does not occur during spree-killings. 
See Statistics on Gun Deaths & Injuries, SMARTGUNLAWS.ORG (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-deaths-and-injuries-statistics/ (citing Web-Based Injury 
Statistics Query & Reporting System Injury Mortality Reports, 1999–2010, for National, 
Regional, and States, NAT’L CENTER FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/dataRestriction 
_inj.html (scroll to bottom and click “I Agree”) (last visited May 4, 2015)). Based on 
recent data from the CDC (from 2010), 31,076 Americans died in gun-caused homicides, 
suicides, and unintentional shootings. Id. An additional 73,505 sought treatment in 
hospital emergency departments for nonfatal gunshot wounds. Id. These statistics show 
that there is a massive amount of gun violence in the United States each year—over 
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But what do I mean, exactly, by a “scapegoat” in this context? 
Philosopher Kenneth Burke described scapegoating as, “in its purest 
form, the use of a sacrificial receptacle for the ritual unburdening of 
one’s sins[.]”22 The scapegoat is a “ ‘representative’ or ‘vessel’ of 
certain unwanted evils”; it is a “sacrificial animal.”23 For Burke, then, 
the scapegoat provides a symbolic place wherein a social group can 
unload its worst: worst thoughts, worst deeds, or worst group-
members. This unloading ritualistically cleans the social group. Thus, 
as James Jasinski explains, Burke saw the scapegoat as a means of 
purifying society of its sins, or of removing its guilt, through a process 
of “externalization.”24 
Externalization can take place in the realm of law-making. 
Joseph E. Kennedy took on the practice of scapegoating in terms of 
criminal punishment, and, in many ways, I extend his research here to 
PPDs. In writing about “[m]onstrous crimes and monstrous 
criminals,” Kennedy points out that these groups “provide appetizing 
fare for a society hungry for agreement and cohesion.”25 He explains 
how, when we associate all criminals with the tiny few who might fit 
the description of “monstrous,” “we exaggerate the worst in order to 
experience the best: moments when we feel as a society that we have 
 
104,000 shootings in 2010 alone—yet only a tiny portion of this violence can be attributed 
to spree-killings perpetrated by PPDs. See Deaths: Final Data for 2013, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm (last 
updated Feb. 6, 2015). One can observe the data and sum the firearm homicides (11,208), 
the firearm accidents (505), the firearm suicides (21,175), and the deaths by firearm 
discharges of “undetermined intent” (281) for 2013. Deaths: Final Data for 2013, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION tbl.10 & 12, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr 
/nvsr64/nvsr64_02.pdf. The sum yields a total of 33,636 deaths for 2013. Id. at tbl.18; see 
Metzl & MacLeish, supra note 15, at 242 (noting, after providing copious evidence that the 
vast majority of violent crime is not perpetrated by mentally ill people, “blaming persons 
with mental disorders for gun crime overlooks the threats posed to society by a much 
larger population—the sane”). 
 22. KENNETH BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE 16 
(1954). For more on Burkean scapegoating in the context of PPDs and violence, see 
generally Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Reframing Sanity: Scapegoating the Mentally Ill in the 
Case of Jared Loughner, in RE/FRAMING IDENTIFICATIONS 159 (Michelle Ballif ed., 
2014). 
 23. KENNETH BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM: STUDIES IN 
SYMBOLIC ACTION 39 (1973). 
 24. JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN 
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL STUDIES 504 (2001). 
 25. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through 
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (2000). Kennedy builds his theory of the 
“secular sacred” upon Emile Durkheim’s theory of punishment. Id. at 833; see EMILE 
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simpson trans., 
MacMillan Co. 1933) (1893). 
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transcended the many differences that keep us apart.”26 This 
exaggeration in order to transcend differences that Kennedy 
describes is scapegoating. Externalization is important to the process 
as well: “The essence of scapegoating is the attempt to identify the 
sources of social problems as external to the group.”27 For example, 
we externalize our fear of gun violence by imagining that it is mostly 
perpetrated during a few high-profile spree-killings by people who 
have serious mental illness (“SMI”). Doing so might make us feel 
better about ourselves—after all, no one we know would ever do 
that—but it ignores the fact that the vast majority of gun violence is 
not perpetrated in spree-killings or by people with SMI.28 
In his article, Kennedy focuses on the rise of the myth of the 
“monstrous criminal” in the 1980s and 1990s and the concurrent rise 
in severe punishments in the U.S. criminal justice system during those 
decades.29 However, his observations about the function of 
scapegoating are now appropriate in what I suggest is our new age of 
the spree-killing.30 Spree-killings create a similar sort of shared feeling 
of out-of-control violation as that described by Kennedy.31 And the 
externalized scapegoat that captures the imagination of the in-group 
are PPDs—the mentally ill, the psycho-killers, the madmen. The 
nightmare of PPDs with guns provides the social “cohesion” that 
Kennedy describes, allowing the crossing of political aisles by folks 
who might not otherwise do so. Scapegoats provide an opportunity 
for political unification. 
The two proposals that unify nearly all political groups in the 
United States against this new scapegoat are stripping otherwise-
protected Second Amendment gun rights from PPDs, discussed in 
Part II, and easing the emergency involuntary civil commitment 
 
 26. Kennedy, supra note 25, at 830. 
 27. Id. at 833. 
 28. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Kennedy, supra note 25, at 831–32. 
 30. For more on the term “spree-killings” and my suggestion about its newness, see 
supra note 7. 
 31. For example, after the spree-killing in Tucson, Arizona, Time ran an article to 
help ease readers’ feelings of out-of-controlness. Kate Pickert & John Cloud, If You Think 
Someone Is Mentally Ill: Loughner’s Six Warning Signs, TIME (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2041733,00.html. The article leads with 
questions echoing the public sentiment after the shooting: “What signs that trouble lay 
ahead were missed? What signs were observed but ignored? In short, what can be done to 
prevent a potentially ill or unstable person from harming others?” Id. It then provides a 
numbered list of the “six warning signs in Loughner” that readers can look for in their own 
coworkers or classmates to ostensibly prevent future spree-killings. Id. 
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standard, what some euphemistically refer to as “increased mental 
health intervention,” discussed in Part III. 
III.  SCAPEGOATS AND GUN RIGHTS 
In the area of gun rights, paradoxically, there is a conjunction 
between the policies of the left and the right as they relate to people 
with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”). The left favors gun regulations 
to begin with,32 so regulation of PPDs’ gun rights fits with their 
preexisting disposition. The right wants to limit the regulation of 
guns, so they have an incentive to blame problems of gun violence on 
a relatively small set of people and, thus, leave the rest relatively 
unregulated.33 
 
 32. For example, after the spree-killing in Newtown, Connecticut, in December 2012, 
Democratic President Barack Obama, Democratic Vice President Joe Biden, and former 
Democratic Congresswoman Gabby Giffords (herself wounded in a spree-killing in 
Arizona in 2011), campaigned for tighter background check laws for gun purchases. 
Republicans in Congress defeated the bill in April 2013. Howard Kurtz, Senate Defeats 
Background Checks, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 
2013/04/17/senate-defeats-background-checks.html. 
 33. This blame shifting played out vividly in the case of an Arlington, Texas, open-
carry activist, Veronica Dunnachie, who murdered her husband and her stepdaughter over 
marital issues on December 10, 2014. Domingo Ramirez, Jr., Affidavit: Domestic Dispute 
Led to 2 Deaths in Arlington, STAR-TELEGRAM (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.star-
telegram.com/news/local/crime/article4428614.html. Dunnachie was “an active member of 
the Open Carry Tarrant County organization,” but the open carry and other gun rights 
organizations that she had supported were quick to ostracize her. See Dan Solomon, After 
an Open Carry Tarrant County Member Was Charged with Shooting Her Husband and His 
Daughter, All Sides of the Gun Debate Got Ugly, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/daily-post/after-open-carry-tarrant-county-member-was-
charged-shooting-her-husband-and-his-daughter. The gun rights blog BearingArms.com 
scapegoated Dunnachie in classic fashion, pushing her out of the in-group and into the 
realm of the outsiders who do not deserve to own guns: “[T]he story about Dunnachie 
runs with the headline ‘BAD APPLE’ in all capital letters, suggesting that she’s an outlier 
who in no way represents the group.” Id. The blog then ran this statement: 
There are 100 million gun owners in the United States, and millions of them 
belong to Second Amendment groups. They are far more law-abiding that [sic] the 
average citizen, a fact that citizen control cultists religiously ignore. The reality of 
the matter is that the vast majority of the violently mentally ill involved in the 
debate are on the side of gun control. They often support gun control 
because . . . they are too mentally unstable to own and use firearms responsibly, 
and they project their deficiencies upon the rest of the world. 
Bob Owens, BAD APPLE: Texas Open Carry Supporter Arrested for Double Homicide, 
BEARINGARMS.COM (Dec. 12, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://bearingarms.com/bad-apple-texas-
open-carry-supporter-arrested-double-homicide/. Thus, the group sets the fault-lines of 
the debate firmly with the sane and gun-toting on one side, and the mentally ill—cast in as 
bizarre a light as possible—on the other. 
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Thus, for the political right (which includes the majority of 
Justices in the Heller opinion), the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms rests, rhetorically, on the backs of those groups who 
are forbidden to do so. Put simply, in Heller, there would be no need 
for guns for self-protection if there were no outsiders—scapegoats—
that one needed protection against. These scapegoats include, among 
others, PPDs. As I will discuss in this section, PPDs are thus 
scapegoated in the era of spree-killings by having their gun rights 
stripped away.34 
Justice Scalia enumerated our society’s gun-scapegoats in the 
majority opinion in Heller, in which he first pointed to other 
scapegoats throughout Anglo-American legal history. Historically, in 
England, Catholics who did not attend Church of England services 
were banned from “universal” (i.e., Protestant) gun ownership.35 
More recently, in the post-Civil War period in the United States, laws 
in the former slave states banned African Americans from owning 
guns.36 These groups—Catholics, African Americans, and the others 
Scalia lists—provided the externalized scapegoats for their particular 
societies at their particular points in history. 
Today, the groups that serve as scapegoats to maintain our 
Second Amendment individual right to bear arms, as articulated by 
Justice Scalia in Heller, include felons37 and, for the purposes of this 
section, those labeled by the courts as “mentally ill.” When we argue 
for the rights of the majority by stripping rights—with near unanimity 
of those making the rights-stripping argument—from a disfavored 
minority, we are scapegoating. 
 
 34. Others have addressed this topic from other angles, for example, the risk of 
suicide that PPDs present should allow for the restriction of their gun rights. See generally 
Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear 
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that the risk of suicide that PPDs 
present should allow for the restriction of their gun rights); Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-
Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633 (2014) (suggesting that PPDs who are 
psychotic should lose their gun rights); Frederick E. Vars, Putting Arms at Arm’s Length: 
Precommitment Against Suicide (Univ. of Ala. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 
2500291, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500291 
(proposing the creation of a voluntary, confidential, federal-background check system that 
those at risk of suicide could add their names to as a means of protecting themselves from 
future self-harm by guns).  
 35. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). 
 36. Id. at 614–15. 
 37. The U.S. Code forbids the sale of firearms to felons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2012); 
it also makes it unlawful for felons “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, 
or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm 
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 
Id. § 922(g)(1). 
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For example, according to Wayne LaPierre, executive vice 
president of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”), individual gun 
ownership is indeed a right, just not a right that “homicidal maniacs” 
possess—a classic rhetorical scapegoating,38 and one that is often 
echoed by NRA supporters.39 LaPierre’s volatile (and ableist40) 
language is reflected, in more muted tones, in the Heller opinion 
itself. Surprisingly, it is reflected not only in the opinion of the 
conservative majority, but also in the opinions of the liberal wing of 
the bench, as I demonstrate in Part II.B. 
A. Scalia’s Majority Opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller  
Scalia states, at the beginning of Part III of his majority opinion 
in Heller, “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”41 He then proceeds to enumerate what 
might, in the majority’s view, constitute valid limitations on people 
who can own guns: “Although we do not undertake an exhaustive 
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, 
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill.”42 Scalia then extends his prohibitions from certain people to 
certain locales, allowing for “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms 
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”43 In 
opposition to these locale limitations and these human scapegoats, 
Scalia sets up an in-group with a locale to stimulate fear: “And 
whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it 
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”44 In 
Table 1, I have created a visual map of Scalia’s arguments. 
 
 38. See NRA Chief Criticizes Navy Yard for Being ‘Unprotected’ Before Mass 
Shooting, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/22/us-usa-
guns-idUSBRE98L0C920130922 [hereinafter LaPierre Comments]. 
 39. See, e.g., Owens, supra note 33. The gun-rights group BearingArms.com writes 
that the mentally ill support gun control because they “are too mentally unstable to own 
and use firearms responsibly.” Id. This is an odd argument for the pro-gun group to make, 
to be sure, as the position they attribute to “the mentally ill” seems quite logical—that is, 
voluntarily giving up one’s guns when one knows one cannot use them responsibly. 
 40. “Ableism is a form of discrimination or prejudice against individuals with physical, 
mental, or developmental disabilities that is characterized by the belief that these 
individuals need to be fixed or cannot function as full members of society.” Laura Smith, 
Pamela F. Foley & Michael P. Chaney, Addressing Classism, Ableism, and Heterosexism in 
Counselor Education, 86 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 303, 304 (2008). 
 41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
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Table 1: Rhetorical Fear Tactics in Heller Majority Opinion 
 
 In-Group: Not Okay 
to Ban Guns 
Scapegoat: Okay to 
Ban Guns 
Disability Status Able-Minded Mentally Ill 
Criminal Status Law-Abiding Criminal 
Locale to Stimulate 
Fear 
Hearth and Home Schools, 
Government 
Buildings 
 
In Part IV of the opinion, shortly after this enumeration of these 
valid limitations of the Second Amendment, Scalia turned his focus 
“to the law at issue here,” the portions of the District of Columbia 
gun ordinance that banned handguns and required trigger locks.45 
Thus, the law had two main elements at issue in the Heller case: (1) a 
total ban of handguns, including handguns in the home;46 and (2) a 
requirement that all lawful firearms in the home (e.g., shotguns) be 
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times.47 
Scalia’s take on these laws, and the rights that they supposedly 
violated, looked like this: “[T]he inherent right of self-defense has 
been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban 
amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is 
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful 
purpose.”48 Thus, he attacks the first part of the law for its targeting of 
handguns. Scalia continues: “The prohibition extends, moreover, to 
the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute.”49 Here, Scalia calls on the rhetorical commonplace of the 
“home,” the family, the sacredness of the hearth, in order to craft 
agreement in his audience with his argument that banning a certain 
gun (a handgun) in a certain place (the home) does not fit into that 
 
 45. Id. at 628; see also Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, 23 D.C. Reg. 1091, 
1097, 1129 (July 23, 1976) (banning handguns and requiring trigger locks). 
 46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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class of Second Amendment exceptions he described in Part III (e.g., 
schools and government buildings). By calling upon the commonplace 
of the home, Scalia invokes fear of home invaders to emotionally 
persuade his readers to agree with him, and ultimately, to agree that 
the gun ban should be struck down. 
But there is another undercurrent of fear at play here, one that 
Scalia may or may not be playing on consciously (although, as he is a 
master rhetorician, I would think his rhetorical moves are 
intentional). Scalia invokes fear in passing with his list of exceptions 
to the Second Amendment: fear of felons (via gun bans for felons), 
fear of harm to our children (via gun bans near schools), and, for my 
purposes here, fear of mental illness (via gun bans for PPDs). Scalia 
scapegoated two classes of persons—felons and PPDs—to justify the 
free flow of handguns to the rest of the American populace. It is fear 
of the mentally ill that justifies the stripping of their Second 
Amendment rights. Scalia does not point to any scientific studies 
linking the gun violence to mental illness, which would be difficult, as 
most studies show less of a link between gun violence and mental 
illness, as I have shown previously in this Article.50 Instead, Scalia 
employs calm language pointing to the “longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,”51 never 
doubting that his readers agree that such laws are not only 
constitutional but also good policy. 
Not only did Scalia’s scapegoating technique create fear to justify 
the stripping of gun rights from PPDs, it also created a cohesive 
insider group populated with non-PPDs, a classic rhetorical move, 
setting up an us-versus-them dichotomy, where the “them” are quite 
scary to many people. Although Scalia did not call PPDs “homicidal 
maniacs on the street” like LaPierre did,52 he touched on the same 
pressure point of fear with his language in the opinion when setting 
up his scapegoating dichotomy. And—here is the final twist—this fear 
in turn justifies gun ownership by the in-group, because the in-group 
now has a reason to own guns for personal defense: the scapegoat. 
Scalia thus subtly plants in his readers’ minds the notion that 
such bans on guns for felons and mentally ill exist because those 
 
 50. See supra notes 14 and 21 and accompanying text; see also Metzl & MacLeish, 
supra note 15, at 241 (“Databases that track gun homicides, such as the National Center 
for Health Statistics . . . show that fewer than 5% of the 120,000 gun-related killings in the 
United States between 2001 and 2010 were perpetrated by people diagnosed with mental 
illness.”). 
 51. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 52. See LaPierre Comments, supra note 38. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015) 
2015] HELLER'S SCAPEGOATS 1453 
people, when they get their hands on guns, commit unspeakable 
acts—at least in the mythos of the scapegoat. And fundamental rights 
to gun ownership for nonfelons and non-PPDs exist for those groups 
to protect themselves, at least in part, against the scary, scapegoated 
outsiders. (I remind readers once more that most acts of gun violence 
are not committed by homicidal maniacs on the street,53 despite what 
Scalia and LaPierre would like us to believe.) 
B. Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg—the liberal wing of the bench in 2008) agreed with Justice 
Scalia that the Second Amendment right “is not absolute.”54 Like 
Scalia’s opinion, Breyer’s opinion is laced with fear, noting at the 
outset that the District’s gun ban was a “permissible legislative 
response to a serious, indeed life-threatening, problem.”55 In Breyer’s 
opinion, the fear is of firearms themselves, in particular firearms 
possessed by a particular class of people who are dangerous.56 The 
opening to his opinion invokes this class of people: “[T]he District’s 
regulation . . . focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-crime 
urban areas.”57 And he closes his opinion similarly: “[T]here simply is 
no untouchable constitutional right guaranteed by the Second 
 
 53. See Ramirez, supra note 33 (describing a December 2014 killing of a man and his 
daughter by the man’s estranged wife); supra note 21 and accompanying text 
(enumerating statistics on gun violence generally, demonstrating how most gun killings 
and injuries do not occur during high profile spree-killings); see also Lauren Kirchner, The 
Very Weak and Complicated Links Between Mental Illness and Gun Violence, PAC. 
STANDARD (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/health-and-behavior/weak-
complicated-links-mental-illness-gun-violence-96672 (finding those who have mental 
illness are less likely to commit gun violence). Kirchner interviewed social scientist 
Jonathan Metzl, author of a recent study on mental health and gun violence, who found, 
“[I]f somebody has a long-term, chronic mental illness diagnosis, they are actually less 
likely to commit a gun crime. It’s exactly the opposite of what you would think in the 
aftermath of these [spree-killing] shootings.” Id. 
 54. Heller, 554 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also wrote a 
dissenting opinion, but his opinion specifically addressed “[w]hether [the Second 
Amendment] protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like 
hunting and personal self-defense.” Id. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For this reason, 
Stevens’s opinion does not invoke the scapegoat. Breyer, on the other hand, states that he 
concurs with Stevens, and then provides this purpose for his opinion: “I shall show that the 
District’s law is consistent with the Second Amendment even if that Amendment is 
interpreted as protecting a wholly separate interest in individual self-defense.” Id. at 681 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In order to do so, as I demonstrate in this section, Breyer does 
invoke the scapegoat. 
 55. Id. at 682.  
 56. Id. at 681. 
 57. Id. 
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Amendment to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden 
urban areas.”58 
The phrase “crime-ridden urban areas” invokes many things, but 
one cannot say that it is free of racial implications. Breyer’s words 
participate implicitly in Scalia’s scapegoating. In this instance, Breyer 
uses the term “urban” as code for black criminals, scapegoating this 
particular group as a way to justify the D.C. gun ban in particular: 
The law is tailored to the urban crime problem in that it is local 
in scope and thus affects only a geographic area both limited in 
size and entirely urban; the law concerns handguns, which are 
specially linked to urban gun deaths and injuries, and which are 
the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed criminals.59 
With these words, Breyer uses fear to make his point as aptly as 
Scalia does. 
Breyer does not agree with Scalia that guns are necessary to 
protect against these dangerous outsider groups; however, Breyer 
does agree that certain groups are dangerous. His solution, therefore, 
is that the gun ban should stand to ensure that these dangerous 
groups—such as urban criminals—cannot get their hands on guns.60 
Put another way, Breyer never disagrees with Scalia’s assessment of 
dangerous groups; he only disagrees that these groups should serve as 
exceptions to the rule that the rest should be able to possess guns: “I 
am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list, in Part III of its opinion, of 
provisions that in its view would survive Second Amendment 
scrutiny.”61 These include, he states, quoting Justice Scalia: 
“ ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ ” and 
“ ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally 
ill.’ ”62 Breyer takes Scalia to task for this list, pointing out the flaws in 
Scalia’s interpretation of the scope of the Second Amendment: “Why 
these? Is it that similar restrictions existed in the late 18th century? 
The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues. And even were it 
possible to find analogous colonial laws in respect to all these 
restrictions, why should these colonial laws count . . . ?”63 But Breyer 
 
 58. Id. at 722. 
 59. Id. at 682. 
 60. Id. (“[A] legislature could reasonably conclude that the law will advance goals of 
great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing injury, and reducing crime. The 
law is tailored to the urban crime problem in that it is local in scope and thus affects only a 
geographic area both limited in size and entirely urban.”). 
 61. Id. at 721. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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is not arguing against Scalia’s list because he believes that felons and 
the mentally ill should be allowed to possess guns. He is simply 
pointing out the flaw in Scalia’s reasoning that suggests that gun 
possession is a universal right—universal with a few named 
exceptions. 
Thus, what Breyer does not do is contemplate the invalidity of 
the list in the first place—only the interpretative dance that brought 
Scalia to the point of needing to provide a list of exceptions at all. 
Indeed, Breyer does not argue that this list should be shortened; on 
the contrary, he seems to believe that this list should be lengthened 
and only quarrels with the fact that Scalia limits it to only those 
particular people. Breyer never suggests that the mentally ill should 
not be singled out as a group that is particularly dangerous. Indeed, 
his opinion is just as fear-ridden as the majority opinion. 
C. Scapegoating and Guns: Taking Aim at the Wrong Problem 
Both Scalia’s and Breyer’s opinions show that legal arguments 
both for and against gun control rely on fear, in particular fear of 
people believed to be dangerous. This use of fear to further one’s 
political aims is scapegoating. 
Not only is scapegoating the mentally ill and other groups in 
order to further a political agenda or make legal arguments 
distasteful, it results in bad policy. The policy problems that arise 
from stripping gun rights from the mentally ill in the fashion that the 
Heller majority contemplates are these: (1) the majority opinion 
targets the wrong group of PPDs in our society’s quest to cure gun 
violence and (2) targeting PPDs as the cause of gun violence will 
scare off PPDs from seeking treatment. 
In more ways than one, the majority opinion in Heller targets the 
wrong group of PPDs in its quest for constitutional gun control. 
Unlike felons, whose status of “felon” derives from their interaction 
with the state, PPDs’ status of “mentally ill” is not so easily marked. 
Thus, like other forms of restrictions on PPDs (such as those that 
arise during bar examinations64), the restriction on gun ownership by 
a PPD relies first upon the PPD having received treatment for a 
psychiatric disability. For the purposes of the federal gun control 
statute, a PPD must have either been “adjudicated as a mental 
defective or . . . been committed to any mental institution,”65 or be 
either “an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance 
 
 64. See McElroy & Pryal, supra note 4. 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015) 
1456 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802 (2012)).”66 Treatment is how a PPD gets marked as mentally ill 
in the first place. 
Thinking about gun restrictions in a logical fashion, given the low 
prevalence of violence among PPDs as demonstrated by scientific 
research,67 the people who are seeking treatment for their disabilities 
are not the people who are most likely to be dangerous—on the 
contrary.68 But only by seeking treatment in the first place does a 
person get “tagged” as “mentally ill” for the purposes of Scalia’s 
reasoning in the Heller majority opinion. For example, in the 
introduction for this Article, I described a woman who sought 
treatment at a hospital, placing herself on the psychiatric “radar” so 
to speak. Her presence at the hospital where she sought treatment put 
her at risk of involuntary commitment for temporary psychosis caused 
by medication for poison ivy. But her involuntary commitment would 
have tagged her as mentally ill and likely interfered with her ability to 
purchase or even own a gun.69 If the woman in my hypothetical were 
a devout gun owner, would this risk of losing her guns have had a 
chilling effect on her seeking of treatment? This question leads me to 
my second point. 
If a person is a devout gun owner, but might otherwise have 
considered seeking treatment for a psychiatric disability, this targeting 
of the mentally ill as the scapegoat for gun violence will likely scare 
her away from seeking treatment. It is hard enough to seek 
psychiatric help: treatment is expensive; treatment is stigmatizing; 
treatment is often difficult to come by as fewer and fewer psychiatrists 
participate with health plans or accept new patients.70 Adding another 
 
 66. Id. § 922(d)(3). 
 67. See supra notes 14 and 21 and accompanying text (summarizing the scientific 
research on the low rates of violence among PPDs despite the misconceptions of the 
public). 
 68. On the contrary, PPDs are more likely to be the victims of violence. See supra 
note 15 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(4), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012)) (prohibiting any person from 
“sell[ing] or otherwise disposing of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or 
having reasonable cause to believe that such person has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or has been committed to any mental institution”); National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Jan. 25, 
2015) (providing general information about National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System (“NICS”) and its purpose). 
 70. Brian Krans, Study: Half of Psychiatrists Don’t Accept Health Insurance, 
HEALTHLINE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/mental-half-of-
psychiatrists-dont-take-health-insurance-121113 (“Though mental health parity laws are in 
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barrier to treatment—loss of gun rights—means that a person who 
might have sought help may not do so. Should this devout gun owner 
present at the hospital with her troubles, she might fear that she runs 
the risk of involuntary commitment—and loss of her guns—a risk that 
she is less likely to run if she simply stays away from doctors 
altogether. 
Thus, the Court has targeted the wrong group for gun bans 
(those who voluntarily sought treatment and are thus least likely to be 
dangerous) and scared off another group from treatment altogether 
(making them more likely to be a public health problem because they 
go untreated). At best, the scapegoating of the mentally ill in Heller is 
terrible public policy. 
IV.  SCAPEGOATS AND EMERGENCY INVOLUNTARY CIVIL 
COMMITMENT 
As Prendergast, Price, Pryal, and other disability scholars have 
noted, people with psychiatric disabilities (“PPDs”) struggle for 
agency—legal, rhetorical, and otherwise.71 Prendergast writes, “If 
people think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you.”72 But the stakes 
are higher these days, as Prendergast notes, due to the quasi-
criminalization of mental illness: “[T]he question of how one listens to 
the mentally ill in an age in which they have been oppressed by the 
effective criminalization of their condition becomes vital.”73 The 
quasi-criminalization of mental illness has come to the fore recently 
for a variety of reasons, including public debate that has pushed 
emergency involuntary civil commitment (“ICC”) as a “Precrime”74 
solution to spree-killing tragedies such as the Washington Navy Yard 
shooting of September 2013.75 Other reasons include the use of jails 
 
effect, the head of the American Psychiatric Association says ‘intimidating’ experiences 
with insurance companies keep some psychiatrists from accepting coverage.”). 
 71. MARGARET PRICE, MAD AT SCHOOL: RHETORICS OF MENTAL DISABILITY AND 
ACADEMIC LIFE 58–102 (2011); Catherine Prendergast, On the Rhetorics of Mental 
Disability, in EMBODIED RHETORICS: DISABILITY IN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 189, 
203 (Martin Nystrand & John Duffy eds., 2003); Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Genre of the 
Mood Memoir and the Ethos of Psychiatric Disability, 40 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 479, 479 
(2010). 
 72. Prendergast, supra note 71, at 203. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in THE PHILIP K. DICK READER 323, 
323 (1987) (creating a fictional world in which mutants can see future crimes before they 
are committed and Precrime agents can arrest and imprison the potential criminals before 
they commit the crimes). 
 75. See infra Part III.A (discussing in greater detail the spree-killing at the 
Washington Navy Yard). 
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and prisons as quasi-mental hospitals in decades since the closure of 
public hospitals (deinstitutionalization) and the poor treatment of 
PPDs while they are incarcerated.76 
In the direct aftermath of a spree-killing, debates over 
emergency ICC come to the fore.77 Largely missing from these public 
debates over emergency ICC are the voices of mentally ill people 
themselves—at least for a while—even though they would be most 
affected by any changes in the law.78 Their voices are missing because 
the genres in which these public debates take place—news reports 
and opinion pieces published in major news outlets, for example—
rhetorically exclude them—either by disallowing their participation or 
encouraging PPDs with nonvisible disabilities to keep their 
disabilities hidden. For example, claiming mental illness as part of 
one’s identity would hurt a journalist’s credibility (ethos) as an 
impartial writer, or an opinion writer’s credibility as a reasoned 
arguer, as mental illness, as perceived by the U.S. public, ruins a 
person’s ability to think in a reasoned and impartial fashion. After all, 
“To be disabled mentally is to be disabled rhetorically.”79 
Even more troubling, these genres reveal a convergence of 
opinion from the left and the right, an agreement that PDDs often 
pose a danger to the public and should be subject to less strict 
procedural protections when facing emergency ICC.80 
In this section, I show how this disabling rhetoric operates by 
examining popular news articles and other documents that were 
published after the Navy Yard shooting committed by Aaron Alexis, 
 
 76. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 17 (“In Wyoming as well as around the country, jails 
and prisons operate as de facto mental health facilities, treating a disproportionately high 
number of offenders with mental illnesses, substance abuse issues and often both.”); 
Rikers Island Jail Criticised for Keeping Mentally Ill Inmates in Solitary, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/06/rikers-island-jail-mentally-ill-
solitary-confinement/ (“About 40% of Rikers’ 12,200 inmates have some kind of mental 
health diagnosis, and about a third of those have so-called serious mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Of the roughly 800 inmates in solitary at any given 
time, just over half of them are mentally ill.”). 
 77. See infra Part III.C (detailing the discussion of public debates over ICC after the 
spree-killing at the Washington Navy Yard). The examples in this Part invoke earlier 
spree-killings to make their arguments. 
 78. In the immediate aftermath of a spree-killing, the voices of PPDs are often 
missing in reasoned debate. See infra Part III.C. However, as time passes, articles appear 
in which the voices of PPDs are present. See, e.g., Electra Draper, Debate Rages in 
Colorado over Involuntary Holds for Mental Illness, DENVER POST (May 25, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25831191/debate-rages-colorado-over-involuntary-holds-
mental-illness. 
 79. Prendergast, supra note 71, at 202. 
 80. See convergence of opinion discussion infra Part III.C. 
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a man widely believed to be mentally ill at the time, revealing the 
predictable rhetorical patterns.81 I highlight two of the most common 
of these genres: (1) early reports breaking news of Alexis’s mental 
illness and (2) opinion pieces arguing for easing the emergency ICC 
standard as a Precrime solution to spree-killing violence—and 
revealing a convergence of the political left and right. 
A. Emergency Involuntary Civil Commitment Statutes: What Is at 
Stake? 
After the Washington Navy Yard shooting in Washington, D.C., 
on September 16, 2013, in which a single shooter named Aaron Alexis 
shot twelve people to death and wounded eight others,82 criticisms 
rang out from many corners. One popular criticism noted how easy it 
was for Alexis to access a military base.83 A second criticism dealt 
with guns; some asked how it was that Alexis could have lawfully 
purchased one, given his arrest record and history of mental 
instability84 (invoking the scapegoating argument Scalia makes in 
Heller). Others, such as the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) 
Wayne LaPierre, criticized the military for not allowing all soldiers on 
military bases such as the Navy Yard to carry guns.85 LaPierre 
 
 81. See infra Parts III.B & III.C (providing rhetorical analyses of the documents, 
revealing these patterns). 
 82. See, e.g., 12 Victims Killed, 8 Wounded in Shooting at D.C. Navy Yard, Suspected 
Gunman Killed, NBC WASH. (Sept. 17, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/ 
news/local/Confirmed-Shooter-at-Navy-Yard-One-Person-Shot-223897891.html. 
 83. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig, Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, Military’s 
Background Check System Failed to Block Gunman with a History of Arrests, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/contractor-would-not-have-
hired-aaron-alexis-if-past-brushes-with-law-had-been-known/2013/09/17/e5bc83da-1faa-
11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html (“The military’s beleaguered background-check 
system failed to block Navy Yard gunman Aaron Alexis from an all-access pass to a half-
dozen military installations, despite a history of arrests for shooting episodes and 
disorderly conduct.”); see also Trip Gabriel, Joseph Goldstein & Peter Schmidt, Suspect’s 
Past Fell Just Short of Raising Alarm, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2013/09/18/us/washington-navy-yard-shootings.html (“[T]he access granted Mr. Alexis, a 
former Navy reservist who as an independent contractor serviced Navy computers, raises 
questions similar to those raised about another outside government contractor, Edward J. 
Snowden, who leaked national intelligence secrets.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Alex Koppelman, Aaron Alexis’s Guns, NEW YORKER (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/aaron-alexiss-guns (“It appears that he 
bought his shotgun legally—reportedly last week, in Virginia. He was allowed to buy a 
firearm despite having apparently struggled with mental illness, and despite his 
involvement in some disturbing gun-related incidents.”). 
 85. See, e.g., id. (“Some conservatives are starting to argue that the problem at the 
Navy Yard was actually that there weren’t enough guns present—that Democrats have 
turned military bases into ‘gun-free zones’ where even trained combat veterans are 
vulnerable to lone madmen.”). 
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famously stated after the Navy Yard shooting, “When the good guys 
with guns got there, it stopped.”86 
Another set of critics asked why the police—and the state 
generally—are unable to more easily involuntarily commit mentally 
ill people on an emergency basis. These critics argued that such 
people, including Alexis, are “clearly disturbed”—at least that is how 
the New Yorker put it.87 And, as one can imagine, the language 
describing PPDs in such articles went downhill from there, creating 
distance between the in-group (the sane) and the scapegoated group 
(PPDs). These critics want to loosen the emergency ICC standards 
across all states.88 Essentially, the authors of these genres argue that 
because of outliers such as Alexis, all laws affecting all PPDs should 
be changed to allow for easier emergency ICC of all PPDs. 
Before delving into the genres that argue for easing the 
procedural standards for emergency ICC, let us examine what is at 
stake in this debate: the emergency ICC statutes themselves. Every 
state has its own version of an emergency ICC standard under which 
a person can be detained under certain circumstances.89 For example, 
North Carolina’s statute is a typical “dangerousness” statute, one that 
uses a “threat to self or others” standard to determine whether a 
person can be held for evaluation.90 About half of U.S. states have 
dangerousness statutes like North Carolina’s.91 The statute provides 
that “[a]nyone who has knowledge of an individual who is mentally ill 
and either (i) dangerous to self, . . . or dangerous to others, . . . or (ii) 
in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or 
deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness . . . ” to 
submit an affidavit and petition the court to take such person into 
custody for evaluation by a physician or psychologist.92 Note that the 
 
 86. Andy Meek, NRA’s Wayne LaPierre: “Good Guys with Guns” Could Have 
Stopped Navy Yard Shooting, TIME (Sept. 22, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/09/22/ 
nras-wayne-lapierre-good-guys-with-guns-could-have-stopped-navy-yard-shooting/. 
 87. Andrew Solomon, An Avoidable Tragedy: Aaron Alexis and Mental Illness, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/09/ 
psychiatry-mass-shootings-aaron-alexis-mental-illness.html. 
 88. See infra Part III.C (discussing the articles arguing for loosening the emergency 
ICC standard). 
 89. An annotated list of each state’s ICC statutes can be viewed on the website for the 
Treatment Advocacy Center, a nonprofit mental health organization. See Emergency 
Hospitalization for Evaluation, TREATMENT ADVOC. CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacy 
center.org/legal-resources/state-standards/2275 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
 90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261 (2014). 
 91. See Emergency Hospitalization for Evaluation, supra note 89. 
 92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015) 
2015] HELLER'S SCAPEGOATS 1461 
statute also allows commitment if the person’s lack of self-care makes 
the person a danger. This is also typical. 
But there have been major changes to the dangerousness 
standard in other states: the other half of U.S. states have changed 
their emergency ICC laws from a dangerousness standard to a “need 
for treatment” standard, or else added the need for treatment 
standard to the dangerousness standard to make it easier to 
involuntarily hold a person.93 In Wisconsin, for example, a state agent 
may detain a person who meets the traditional dangerous standard,94 
or who shows either “[a] substantial probability of physical 
impairment or injury to himself or herself due to impaired judgment, 
as manifested by evidence of a recent act or omission.”95 or 
“[b]ehavior manifested by a recent act or omission that, due to mental 
illness or drug dependency, he or she is unable to satisfy basic needs 
for nourishment, medical care, shelter, or safety without prompt and 
adequate treatment.”96 The Wisconsin statute is thus far more 
expansive than the North Carolina statute, allowing officers to 
involuntarily commit any person they suspect of having a mental 
illness and who seems unable to provide self-care—even if the person 
does not seem dangerous. The Wisconsin statute retains the 
dangerousness standard, but it adds, as an option for the state, the 
need for treatment standard, giving officers more leeway in 
emergency ICC. 
These statutes allow the state (in the form of police or another 
state agent) to apprehend and involuntarily hospitalize for evaluation 
a person who meets the standard under which a person can be 
detained in that jurisdiction, e.g., dangerousness, need for treatment, 
or some combination of both.97 The state procedures usually work 
like this: A person arrives at a hospital and acts in a way that meets 
the statutory standard (e.g., apparently dangerous or in need of 
treatment). The hospital staff then detains the person. Or if the 
person behaves in a way that meets the statutory standard in public, 
the police detain the person and bring him or her to a hospital.98 
 
 93. For a state-by-state comparison, see Emergency Hospitalization and Evaluation, 
supra note 89. 
 94. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.15(1)(a)(1), (2) (West 2012). 
 95. Id. § 51.15(1)(a)(3). 
 96. Id. § 51.15(1)(a)(4). 
 97. What follows is a summary of the procedures across the United States, drawn 
from CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 810–11 (5th ed. 2009). 
 98. Id. 
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Once the person arrives at a hospital, the hospital’s psychiatric 
lock-down ward can hold the person for forty-eight or seventy-two 
hours with mere probable cause or a similarly low standard, often 
upon the examination by only one or two doctors.99 After the first 
hold period, another examination must take place, and sometimes a 
hearing before a judge (which can be by phone).100 After this 
examination, a patient can be held for another two weeks or even 
longer.101 None of this procedure rises to the procedural requirements 
of true involuntary civil commitment, which requires a more complete 
judicial process, as all of this procedure is operating on an emergency 
basis.102 
After the Navy Yard shooting, the opinion pages of newspapers 
across the United States were plastered with calls for easing the 
emergency ICC standard as a way to prevent future tragedies.103 This 
call for more ICC is a classic scapegoat argument: if we can just lock 
away the potential wrongdoers, then there will be no more 
wrongdoing. The objects of our fear will be permanently isolated, and 
we—those that remain—will be safe. Underlying this Precrime 
argument is the belief that the scapegoats (the mentally ill) are to 
blame for society’s ills (unsafe gun use). 
The procommitment opinion piece was not the only genre that 
emerged after the Navy Yard shooting, however, and viewing this 
genre alongside others can help reveal how these genres emerged and 
how they scapegoated PPDs. Prior to the procommitment arguments 
came the early news reports breaking the story of Alexis’s mental 
illness. Following on the heels of these news reports came the 
arguments for easing the emergency ICC standard—in direct response 
to the news of Alexis’s mental illness. As the next section shows, the 
news reports, which came first, laid the groundwork for the 
arguments for easing the emergency ICC standard. 
B. Post-Shooting News Report Genre 
Before the policy debates began over ICC, news reports broke 
the story of the shooting and personal information about Aaron 
Alexis. Of the articles that fall into the news-report genre, I examine 
specifically the news reports that broke the story of Aaron Alexis’s 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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psychiatric disability.104 These reports share predictable conventions 
(that is, traits or characteristics) that arose in response to the rapidly 
evolving postcrisis situation involving a likely mentally-ill spree-
shooter. For example, they share conventions with news reports that 
have appeared after other similar tragedies, such as the shootings in 
Tucson, Arizona, in 2011.105 
The breaking news reports share some strong generic similarities 
(see Table 2). First, the authors of the news reports are journalists for 
major news outlets such as the Associated Press, Reuters, the 
Washington Post, or CNN. For each piece, either the venue or the 
author possesses great respectability as a news source. Despite this 
(or because of this) respectability, the articles tend to lead with wacky 
headlines that make Alexis sound as “crazy” and “other” as possible. 
For example, one such article was titled, “Aaron Alexis, Navy Yard 
Shooting Suspect, Thought People Followed Him with Microwave 
Machine.”106 The articles then begin with quick summary paragraphs 
that highlight how “delusions” caused Alexis to go on a shooting 
rampage.107 These headlines work in not-so-subtle ways to push 
Alexis into an outsider scapegoat position by making him seem 
strange, bizarre. 
 
 104. To find articles that fit this parameter, I used the search engine Google, the search 
terms “Aaron Alexis,” and a search time frame of September 2013. I pulled the top fifteen 
articles that Google presented. A quick read revealed that those published on September 
17, 2013, did not contain accurate information or any information on Alexis’s mental 
health. I thus limited my search from September 18, 2013, to September 30, 2013. 
 105. Shortly after the shootings in Tucson, Arizona, in 2011 by Jared Loughner, similar 
news reports emerged, pointed to the mental illness of Loughner, his brushes with the 
mental health system, and the system’s failure to prevent the violence. See Pryal, supra 
note 22, at 159–67. Media articles covering tragedies that get classified as “terrorism,” such 
as the Boston Bombing, share a different set of conventions. Enumerating all of these 
conventions is beyond the scope of this article. However, they often deemphasize the 
mental health of the attacker. 
 106. Eric Tucker, Aaron Alexis, Navy Yard Shooting Suspect, Thought People Followed 
Him with Microwave Machine, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/18/aaron-alexis-microwave-machine_n_3946916.html; 
see Peter Hermann & Ann E. Marimow, Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis Driven by Delusions, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ local/crime/fbi-police-detail-
shooting-navy-yard-shooting/2013/09/25/ee321abe-2600-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html. 
 107. See, e.g., Associated Press, VA Sheds Light on Mental Health of Navy Yard 
Gunman Aaron Alexis, CBS.COM (Sept. 18, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/va-sheds-light-on-mental-health-of-navy-yard-gunman-aaron-alexis/; Greg Botelho 
& Joe Sterling, FBI: Navy Yard Shooter “Delusional,” Said “Low Frequency Attacks” 
Drove Him to Kill, CNN.COM (Sept. 26, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2013/09/25/us/washington-navy-yard-investigation/ (“Aaron Alexis was under ‘the 
delusional belief that he was being controlled or influenced by extremely low frequency 
electromagnetic waves’ before he embarked on a bloody shooting rampage at the 
Washington Navy Yard, an FBI official said Wednesday.”). 
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Table 2: Early Reports Breaking News of Alexis’s Mental Illness 
 
Authors and 
Venues 
 Authors are journalists for major news 
sources including unattributed pieces 
for AP/Reuters.  
 Venues are CNN.com, CBS.com, 
Washington Post, USA Today, AP & 
Reuters via Huffington Post (i.e., major 
news outlets). 
Conventions of 
Genre 
 Headline emphasizing craziness of 
Alexis. 
 Opening summarizing how delusions. 
drove Alexis, proof from his own 
writings and inscriptions on his gun. 
 Evidence emphasizing the failure of 
military and gun-purchase background 
checks. 
Purpose of Genre  To pinpoint a motive for the killings 
(i.e., the delusions). 
 To place blame for the killings (e.g., on 
mental health care failures, gun control 
failures, or government background 
check failures). 
 To make Alexis an outsider/scapegoat. 
 
When the articles are read together, their shared purposes 
emerge. The articles primarily search for a motive for the killings—
Alexis’s delusions—and search for someone or something to blame. 
Alexis seems without motive; article after article point out that he 
shot people at random and did not act out of revenge.108 Furthermore, 
due to his illness, he also seems relatively blameless in the sense that 
he lacked a “guilty mind” or “intent.” He is also dead (shot dead at 
the scene by government agents)109 and therefore no longer around 
for us, as a society, to punish. Thus, lacking a wrongdoer to blame, the 
news reports shift blame to other places. They point to Alexis’s 
employer, a government contractor whose background check system 
 
 108. See, e.g., Hermann & Marimow, supra note 106 (noting that “investigators believe 
that Alexis fired at random”). 
 109. See 12 Victims Killed, 8 Wounded in Shooting at D.C. Navy Yard, Suspected 
Gunman Killed, supra note 82. 
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with the Department of Defense gave Alexis access to the Navy Yard 
in the first place.110 They point to the ease with which the obviously 
crazy Alexis legally purchased the shotgun he used in the killings (in 
the state of Virginia).111 The articles also point to an interaction with 
the police in Rhode Island in the weeks before the shooting, when 
Alexis told police that he was being stalked and arguably acted 
paranoid and delusional.112 The Rhode Island police did not detain 
him because they did not believe he was dangerous113—that is, he did 
not meet the dangerousness standard for emergency ICC. By 
highlighting Alexis’s erratic behavior, the articles also work to 
scapegoat Alexis (and others like him), pushing him into an external, 
outsider position. They also subtly (or not-so-subtly) argue for easing 
the emergency ICC standard.114 
The opinion genres that followed the news reports dealt with the 
different argument topics first touched on in the news reports: Who 
was to blame for the failure to screen out Alexis as a government 
contractor? How can we limit access to guns for PPDs? Should we 
ease emergency ICC standards? These different arguments, spawned 
by the news reports, moved across genres into opinion pieces, 
political speeches, and others. The news reports posed this question, 
some patently, some latently: Is our emergency ICC process, at least 
in part, to blame for these killings? This question was bolstered by the 
click-bait headlines and laser-sharp focus on Alexis’s mental state. 
The opinion-writing commentariat, from both sides of the political 
spectrum, responded: Yes. 
 
 110. See Gabriel, Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 83 (noting that there was “a 
growing list of questions about how Mr. Alexis, who had a history of infractions as a Navy 
reservist, mental health problems and run-ins with the police over gun violence, gained 
and kept a security clearance from the Defense Department that gave him access to 
military bases, including the navy yard, where he was shot to death by the police”); see 
also Miranda Green, A Visit to Sharpshooters, Where Aaron Alexis Bought His Shotgun, 
DAILY BEAST (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/18/a-visit-to-
sharpshooters-where-aaron-alexis-bought-his-shotgun.html (noting that Sharpshooters 
customers did not see a connection between gun control and the Navy Yard shooting, 
attributing the violence instead to “the government’s security clearance system”). 
 111. See Green, supra note 110 (interviewing members of the gun range where Alexis 
bought his shotgun, where one member stated, “[I]t’s a mental health 
issue. . . . [S]omebody who is sensible is not going to do the wrong thing”). 
 112. See sources cited supra notes 106–07. 
 113. See sources cited supra notes 106–07. 
 114. See infra Part III.C (discussing proposed changes to the Emergency ICC 
standard). 
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C. Involuntary Civil Commitment Opinion Piece Genre 
The news reports revealed that Aaron Alexis had a run-in with 
the police in Newport, Rhode Island, just weeks before the Navy 
Yard shooting. On August 7, 2013, while he was staying in a Newport 
hotel room, he called the police, reporting that “people were talking 
to him through the walls and ceilings of his hotel rooms and sending 
microwave vibrations into his body to deprive him of sleep.”115 
Despite his words, the police did not detain Alexis because he did not 
seem dangerous to them. Thus, the debate over the dangerousness 
standard and emergency ICC came to the fore. This debate took 
place, in part, on the opinion pages of major news outlets. These 
opinion pieces emerged as a genre, sharing certain conventions (that 
is, traits or characteristics) driven by the particular events of the Navy 
Yard shooting. They also shared conventions with similar pieces that 
emerged after spree-killing tragedies in the past.116 
Table 3 outlines the conventions of the ICC opinion piece genre 
that arose in mainstream publications. The table contains only 
observations of the genre’s conventions based on the sample studied: 
 
 115. Associated Press, supra note 107. 
 116. To find articles to fit this parameter, I used the search engine Google, the search 
terms “Aaron Alexis” and “need for treatment,” (both in quotation marks), with no time 
limiter. “Need for treatment” is the technical term for the legal standard that states adopt 
to loosen their civil commitment standards. I pulled all articles from major news sources 
that this search revealed. I did not pull from personal blogs or websites or from advocacy 
sites. I pulled over twenty different articles. 
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Table 3: Opinion Pieces Arguing for Easing the Emergency 
Involuntary Civil Commitment Standard 
 
Authors and Venues  Authors include politicians,117 
psychiatrists,118 and writers who have 
published books about mental illness.119 
 One author published a major memoir 
in 1998 about his recovery from 
depression; he also has a doctorate in 
psychology.120 
 Venues include major news outlets such 
as the Washington Post and USA 
Today. 
Conventions of 
Genre 
 Pieces link together the tragedies 
leading up to Navy Yard shooting (e.g., 
Tucson, Aurora, and Newtown) to point 
out a trend of violence and mental 
illness. 
 Pieces insist that mental illness is just 
like any other illness and needs 
treatment, but most mental illness goes 
untreated. 
 Pieces point out that most mentally ill 
are not violent, but also imply or openly 
state a connection between untreated 
mental illness and spree-killings. 
 At the end, pieces argue that 
“dangerousness” standard is too high, 
and we should adopt “need for 
 
 117. See, e.g., Ron Barber, A First Step in Addressing the Mental Health Aspect of Mass 
Shootings, HILL (Feb. 12, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/healthcare/198134-a-first-step-in-addressing-the-mental-health-aspect-of-mass. 
 118. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel, We Have the Tools to Prevent Another Shooting Spree, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Sept. 19, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/ 
2013-09-19/we-have-the-tools-to-prevent-another-shooting-spree.48. 
 119. See, e.g., Pete Earley, Op-Ed., Deeds Attack Shows that Our System Is a Mess, 
USATODAY (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/11/20/ 
pete-earley-creigh-deeds-mental-illness/3654793/ [hereinafter Earley, Deeds Attack]; Pete 
Earley, Op-Ed., Getting the Mentally Ill the Help They Need, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-lower-threshold-for-committing-mentally-ill-
people/2013/09/27/52350fac-26bb-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html [hereinafter Earley, 
Getting the Mentally Ill Help]. 
 120. Andrew Solomon, Biography, ANDREWSOLOMON.COM, http://andrewsolomon.com/ 
andrew-solomon-biography/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
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treatment.”  
Purpose of Genre  To argue that mentally ill people need 
greater access to medical treatment. 
 To point out that PPDs will not seek 
this treatment for themselves, so we 
must intervene and force treatment 
upon them. 
 To argue that ICC must be easier or the 
mentally ill will “slip through the social 
fabric,” (as Solomon and those on the 
left put it) or commit more spree-
killings (as those on the right put it). 
 
As Table 3 illustrates, the authors included public leaders, such 
as politicians, medical experts, such as psychiatrists, and popular 
figures in the psychiatric disability, world such as those who have 
published memoirs about mental illness. The big-name venues that 
published these pieces calling for easier ICC standards, such as The 
New Yorker and the Washington Post, gave credence to the 
arguments. 
One troubling aspect of this genre becomes apparent when you 
study its conventions: the pieces uniformly call for the “need for 
treatment” standard despite the authors’ similarly uniform 
observation that most PPDs are not violent, especially not towards 
others.121 The authors tend to strike a sympathetic tone, verging on 
paternalistic, stating that they only want to get PPDs the treatment 
that they need. But then the authors take a darker turn: they link the 
Navy Yard shooting to what they argue is a pattern of spree-killings 
committed by PPDs122 and suggest that the only way to stop these 
killings is to ease the emergency ICC standards.123 Logically, this 
argument suggests that all PPDs are potentially prone to violence. 
Thus, the authors of these articles seem to speak out of both sides of 
their mouths. 
 
 121. See, e.g., Satel, supra note 118 (“As a psychiatrist, I have frequently seen psychotic 
patients brought into the emergency room by police, only to be released into the night 
because of a toxic combination of restrictive commitment laws and a desperate shortage of 
psychiatric beds. For the most part, such sad stories affect only the patients themselves and 
their families.”). 
 122. Id. (“The most important component of reform, however, is to ensure that these 
legal tools are used. Arizona, where Jared Lee Loughner shot Representative Gabrielle 
Giffords and 17 others in 2011, has a need for treatment standard.”). 
 123. Id. (“States shouldn’t stop there. More should adopt an even more progressive 
type of commitment statute: the ‘need for treatment’ standard.”). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439 (2015) 
2015] HELLER'S SCAPEGOATS 1469 
Like the news report genre, many authors of the ICC genre were 
nondisabled people. With the ICC genre, these nondisabled people 
were making proposals for how to deal with PPDs that included ways 
to more easily confine them involuntarily. Such arguments 
prominently made by nondisabled people have prompted the 
disability rights movement to argue with slogans such as “Nothing 
About Us Without Us.”124 
Only two writers examined here arguably could claim authority 
to speak on behalf of PPDs, rather than just about them. The first 
such writer, Pete Earley, is the author of a book about navigating the 
mental health system on behalf of his son, who has bipolar disorder.125 
In arguing—forcefully, in multiple major venues—for a need for 
treatment standard for ICC, Earley calls upon his negative 
experiences trying to get care for his son.126 In other words, even 
though his position is one of a sympathetic advocate for PPDs, he is 
arguing that it should be easier to involuntarily commit PPDs. As 
disability studies scholar Melanie Yergeau and others have noted, 
advocacy groups composed predominantly of family members of 
people with disabilities often have markedly different agendas than 
do people with disabilities themselves.127 Earley, by arguing for easing 
 
 124. See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY 
OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT, at ix–x (2000) (arguing that oppression of people with 
disabilities is rooted in their dependency and disempowerment, and urging nondisabled 
people to recognize that disabled people know what is best for themselves). 
 125. PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER’S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA’S MENTAL 
HEALTH MADNESS (2007). 
 126. See Earley, Getting the Mentally Ill Help, supra note 119. In an article arguing for 
easing the ICC standard, Earley quickly summarizes two negative encounters he had with 
mental health-care providers when he tried to get his son involuntarily committed: 
In 2002, a Fairfax County emergency room turned me away because my college-
age son, who was delusional and had been hospitalized twice for treatment of 
bipolar disorder, was deemed not sick enough to hospitalize. Police advised me to 
claim he was dangerous to get him admitted. Three years later, I called the 
county’s Mobile Crisis Unit for help but was again told that I had to wait until my 
son became dangerous. When he did, that unit refused to come because the 
dispatcher decided, based on my call, that my son was too dangerous. Instead, the 
police came and shot my son twice with a stun gun. 
Id. One might wonder what Earley’s son thinks about being used as the poster boy in the 
national media for easing the standards for ICC. All we can do is wonder because Earley’s 
son Kevin (Mike in Earley’s writing) is not writing the op-eds for national newspapers. 
Kevin did get some airtime on his dad’s blog in 2014, however. Kevin Earley, If You Are 
Afraid to Tell Your Story, Stigma Wins, PETEEARLEY.COM (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.peteearley.com/2014/07/14/son-says-afraid-tell-story-stigma-wins/. 
 127. See generally, Melanie Yergeau, Circle Wars: Reshaping the Typical Autism Essay, 
30 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1 (2010) (pointing out that a “typical convention of the typical 
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the standard to need for treatment, claims to speak for what is best 
for PPDs, including his son, yet what he is arguing for is the same 
scapegoating tactic—rounding up the potential wrongdoers, the 
Precrime approach—albeit with softer language. 
The second writer that could arguably be said to be speaking on 
behalf of PPDs, Andrew Solomon, wrote about Aaron Alexis and 
argued for the need for a treatment standard (thereby easing the 
emergency ICC standard) in The New Yorker.128 Solomon has 
published two famous “mood memoirs”129 about his own major 
depression.130 Unlike Earley, however, Solomon does not draw on his 
own experience with mental illness in his opinion piece on ICC and 
the Navy Yard shooting. On the contrary, he creates rhetorical 
distance between himself and Alexis, whom he says suffered from 
“derangement,” was “clearly depressed,” and was “delusional”—
among other things.131 Rather than claiming authority to speak on the 
issue as a PPD, Solomon claims authority as a scientist: he uses 
scientific terms and relies upon his education, a doctorate in 
psychology from Cambridge University.132 Indeed, Solomon’s article 
is titled, “An Avoidable Tragedy,”133 falling squarely into the genre 
described here. The way Solomon positioned himself as a scientist 
and distanced himself from the “delusional” Alexis suggests that he 
does not want to be mistaken for a member of the scapegoated group 
(PPDs), at least not in a piece in which he argues for a Precrime 
solution to spree-killings. Thus, although Solomon has made a living 
writing memoirs of his own severe psychiatric disability, he is quick to 
 
autism essay [is] where experts on autism [including family members] know more than 
those with autism”).  
 128. Solomon, supra note 87. 
 129. For more on the memoir genre and the psychiatrically disabled, see, for example, 
Pryal, supra note 71, at 489, arguing that “mood memoirs” can be read as narrative-based 
responses to the rhetorical exclusion suffered by the psychiatrically disabled, and 
Catherine Prendergast, Mental Disability and Rhetoricity Retold: The Memoir on Drugs, in 
CHANGING SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DISABILITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 60, 65 (David Bolt ed., 2014), 
pointing out how memoirs of the psychiatrically disabled “document[] the experience of 
psychosis—and ensuring relief from it—from the inside.” 
 130. ANDREW SOLOMON, THE NOONDAY DEMON: AN ATLAS OF DEPRESSION 11 
(2001); Andrew Solomon, Anatomy of Melancholy, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 46, 
46–61. Solomon has published more books on psychiatric disability, including, more 
recently, ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN AND THE 
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (2012). 
 131. Solomon, supra note 87. 
 132. Solomon, supra note 120. 
 133. Solomon, supra note 87. 
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place himself in the in-group, rather than the scapegoated group, in 
his article on Alexis and emergency ICC. 
For example, Solomon writes at the conclusion of his piece: “But 
until we develop a social model that includes finding and treating 
those who suffer from these complaints, we will be subjected to 
scenes like the one at the Navy Yard over and over again.”134 This 
language evokes fear of the scapegoated group—of the deranged, 
paranoid, spree-killer on the loose just waiting to commit another 
atrocity. His solution is to “find and treat” those who might harm us. 
He contrasts Alexis’s case to the 1999 school shooting at Columbine 
High School, located in Jefferson County, Colorado: “Some 
shootings, like Columbine, are perpetrated by people of whom no one 
would ever have expected such violent acts. Those events, which 
appear random, will be difficult to contain.”135 However, Alexis’s 
situation was not like the situation in Columbine: “But many are 
perpetrated, as this one was, by people who are clearly disturbed. 
Some cases are hard to pick up. Alexis’s was not.”136 Solomon’s 
position, then, is a gentler version of Precrime: we must “find” 
perpetrators before they commit spree-killings, and we must “treat” 
them to prevent the spree-killings. One can ask: What does 
“treatment” entail? And is it voluntary? What are we willing to 
subject PPDs to against their will to create a feeling of safety for 
ourselves? And given the “Columbine Exception” that Solomon 
describes, what is the point? 
Furthermore, Solomon does not write from a position in which 
he identifies himself with the scapegoated Alexis. That Solomon 
himself is a PPD who suffered from terrible depression and shared his 
suffering publicly does not cause him to express empathy with Alexis 
in his piece. Rather, his language in the article places himself within 
the in-group and further externalizes and scapegoats Alexis. 
D. The Left and Right Converge on Emergency Involuntary Civil 
Commitment 
After the Navy Yard shooting, one of the more inflammatory 
public commentators on PPDs, NRA executive vice president Wayne 
LaPierre, said this: “If we leave these homicidal maniacs on the 
street . . . they’re going to kill. . . . They need to be committed is what 
they need to be. If they are committed, they’re not at the Naval 
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Yard.”137 LaPierre said this on NBC’s “Meet the Press” shortly after 
the Navy Yard shooting.138 Earley, the father of a PPD, and Andrew 
Solomon, himself a PPD, both argued, also, for easing the emergency 
ICC standard and giving the state more power to round up PPDs and 
treat them against their will.139 LaPierre’s political stance could not be 
farther from Earley’s and Solomon’s. Their tone and word choice 
could not have been more different. But they were arguing essentially 
the same position: easing the emergency ICC standard will prevent 
spree-killing tragedies like the one at the Navy Yard. Locking up the 
maniacs will keep the rest of us safe. These are scapegoating 
arguments, which sacrifice PPDs to make the rest of us feel better. 
CONCLUSION 
Most jurisdictions, including the federal government, have laws 
banning firearm ownership by persons with certain histories of mental 
illness.140 The National Instant Criminal Background Check System, 
or NICS, helps implement these laws.141 These laws vary and 
change,142 but currently they are unified under our popular and 
political discourse that follows every spree-killing such as the one at 
the Washington Navy Yard. The Navy Yard tragedy prompted the 
NRA’s Wanye LaPierre’s comments that redirected public anger 
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mentally ill. 
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away from guns and towards people with mental illness. But 
LaPierre’s arguments are merely a hamfisted manifestation of a 
scapegoating that we are all complicit in, including Scalia, Breyer, and 
the NRA: PPDs are the sacrificial receptacle for the ritual 
unburdening of our nation’s sin of gun violence, even though PPDs 
are irrefutably responsible for so little of it.143 PPDs just make the 
news because they undergird the national conversation about guns. 
There cannot be a newsworthy murder any longer without a 
newscaster asking, “Was he crazy”? Mental illness is the go-to 
explanation to explain away gun violence. 
When gun advocates and gun-control advocates talk about the 
right to bear arms, both sides say, “Well, except for the maniacs.” 
This common refrain is the refrain of scapegoating. 
Reading Heller, and the debates surrounding emergency ICC, it 
is difficult to see that PPDs also have the fundamental right to own a 
gun and protect their homes; it is as though PPDs are, in Second 
Amendment terms, no longer people at all. Indeed, emergency ICC, 
at its most fundamental level, completely removes a person from his 
or her home. We do not ask, are PPDs actual people with homes, 
hearths, and families in need of protection at all? When we speak of 
the ease with which PPDs should lose their gun rights and be 
involuntarily committed, the answer appears to be: No, they are not. 
  
 
 143. See supra notes 14 and 21 for studies on the low correlation between PPDs and 
violence; note 15 for research showing how PPDs are far more likely to be the victims of 
violence than to perpetrate it; and note 7 for research showing the correlation between 
spree-killings (which are anomalies) to the rest of the gun violence that occurs annually in 
the United States. 
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